guistic relativity, variously attributable to Humboldt, Boas, Sapir, and Wharf, was that the semantic structures of differem languages mighl be fundamentally incom mensurable, with consequences for the way in which speakers of specific languages migh t think and act. On this view, language, thought, and culture are deeply in terlocked, so that each language might be claimed to have associated with it a distinctive world view.
This idea captured the imagination of a generation of anthropologists, psychologists, and linguists, as well as members of the general public. It had deep implications for the way anthropologists conduct their business, sug gesting that translational difficulties might lie at the heart of their discipline. But the idea seemed abruptly and entirely discredited in the 1960s by the rise of the cognitive sciences, which emphasized the commonality of human cognition and its basis in human genetic en dowment, in part building on Piagetian universals of hu· man development. This emphasis was strengthened by developmems in linguistic anthropology, with the dis covery of significant semantic universals in color terms, the structure of ethnobotanical nomenclature, and (argu ably) kinship terms.
However, there has been a recent change of intellec tual climate in psychology, linguistics, and other disci plines surrounding anthropology, as well as in linguistic anthropology, towards an intermediate position in which more attention is paid to linguistic and cultural difference-such diversity being viewed within the con text of what we have learned about universals. New work in developmental psychology, while acknowledg ing universal bases, emphasizes the importance of the sociocultural Context of human development. In socio linguistics and linguistic anthropology there has also been increasing attention to meaning and discourse and a growing appreciation of how interpretive differences can be rooted as much in the systematic uses of language as in its structure la point made decades ago by Dell Hymes!.
It therefore seemed opportune to reopen the classic issues and connect them to modern developments. The conference organizers had a grand vision, which went something like this: Linguistic relativity is a hypothesis about meaning-that the meanings expressible in one language may be incommensurable with those expressed in another. Very little is known about substantive se mantic universals, and the demonstration of universal patterning in a few domains such as color terminology carries no necessary general implications. But regardless of how universal linguistic categorization turns out to be, recent developments in the theory of meaning show that "meaning" i& not fully encapsulated in lexicon and grammar, which provide only schematic constraints on what the speaker will be taken to have meant in a partic ular utterance. A large part of the burden of interpreta tion is thus shifted to theories of use. Some important principles of the use of language may plausibly be argued to be universal (e.g., Grice's "maxims of conversation" and their associated implicatures and the turn-taking and repair systems described in conversation analysisl.
But others seem much more clearly culture-specific (e.g., rules for producing and interpreting utterances in British crown courts). In that case, aspects of meaning and inter pretation are determined by culture-specific activities and practices. Those activities and practices are inter connected in turn with the larger sociopolitical systems that govern and are in turn in part constituted by them: particular divisions of labor and social networks provide differential access to such activities and the associated patterns of language use.
In this way, the organizers hoped to build an arch from the classic Whorfian issues of the relation of grammar to thought to consideration of language use in sociohis torical perspective. One keystone in the arch was the phenomenon of deixis or indexicality, whereby words like I, now, here, polite pronouns, and so on, have their interpretations specified by the circumstances of use. This necessarily anchors meaning and interpretation to the context of language use and thus to wider social organization. Issues of linguistic relativity are in this way directly related to the variable structuring of con texts.
Linguistic relativity is connected, Whorf argued, to the linguistic and cultural determinism of habitual thought patterns. Therefore the second keystone to the arch is the idea, now an undercurrent in a number of disciplines, that "cognitive processes" cannot be fully located within the individual. Edwin Hutchins (unfortu nately unable to attend the symposium) has made the point ethnographically by showing how the crew of a ship acts as a collective data-gathering and decision making machine even though no one member of the crew has an overall picture of the situation at anyone moment in time. Again, an abacus user's calculations are in some sense partly "outside the head,lI the proce dures partially encapsulated in the device itself. Tack Goody has emphasized that literacy confers a technolog ical advantage not just by overcoming the limitations of time and space associated with speech but also by allowing the externalization of cognition, that is, mak ing available for post-hoc examination certain aspects of thinking and thereby facilitating a new multidimen sional manipulation of what is in the oral-auditory chan nel a linear medium. Even in societies of the simplest technology there are systems of mnemonics, including special speech genres, and decision making (divination, etc.l. Indeed, students of social interaction argue that interpretations of utterances are jointly arrived at by a step-by-step process revealed in interactive discourse, so that what an utterance ends up as meaning cannot al ways be attributed to a single speaker.
More generally, one can argue that there is a very spe cial kind of domain of discursive practice and external ized cognition that lies in some sense between the inner life of the mind and the outer world of objects and be havior, partaking of both. This is a domain peopled by objects and events of weird and perplexing ontology, such as "intelligent objects" or conceptual tools jmatri ces, abaci, computers) and the whole range of symbolic human action and interaction. Such objects and events are philosophically perplexing because their essence is both physical and ideational Iwitness philosophical de bate on the nature of Itartificial intelligence" or inten tional behavior!.
The social sciences were founded on Durkheim's argu ment that the irreducibility of social facts made psycho logical reductionism impossible, and we have inherited a legacy of division and, indeed, a tendency to reduc tionism in opposite directions towards the psychological or the social. The new recognition of a middle ground, this domain of externalized cognition, which essentially partakes of both the psychological and the social, prom ises to overcome a dichotomy that has always left "so cial facts" in an ontological limbo. It is the externaliZ3 tion of cognition in physical objects, social interaction, and language use that makes possible the learning and socialization of new individuals in a language and cul rure. By the same lOken, it is the study of this domain that gives the ethnographer access to another culture land indeed gives analysts empirical access 10 the life of the mind in their own cultures I. The domain of exter nalized cognition is the crucible in which language, thought, and culture are melded in social interaction, each bringing intrinsic constraints of its own to the characteristic local alloy. Intrinsic cognitive constraints luniversals of human thoughtj and intrinsic linguistic contraints (i.e. , nontrivial linguistic universals) are one set of forces operating on the domain of externalized cognition, but equally there are sociohistorical forces, constraining or making available activities, special uses of language, and "knowledge technologies" Isuch as lit eracy or computing devices) which may fundamentally alter the nature of the domain. Social forces also deter mine differential access to such advanced cognitive ma nipulations Ithrough schooling, training, or restrictions on the use of such cognitive toolsl. It is important 100 10 remember that humans entertain crucial concepts le.g., "guilty," "not guilty"l whose application can only be determined by a social procedure embedded in a political institution, which acts like a distributed information processing device.
How did the grand design fare when scrutinized by experts from the various disciplines gathered together at the conference? Only moderately well-but then, after all, "moderately well" for such a broad sweep of ideas across so many disciplines perhaps counts as success.
The conference began with a reassessment of the clas sical formulations of linguistic relativity and the associ ated claim of linguistic determinism of thought and then progressed to possible relativity in the use of language and thus to the sociohistorical conditioning of linguistic resourceS and their use. Initial discussion focussed on the idea that the linguistic categories that our language forces us to use mould our conceptual categories. Ex treme versions of linguistic determinism hold that a specific language constrains thinking and perception in particular directions, which add up to a culture-specific world view. This no longer seems tenable for a number of reasons: first, there is evidence of many kinds for sig nificant universals in language j perception, and cogniVolume 32, Number 5, December 1991 I 615 tive development; secondly, the argument, experiment, and analysis in favor of it no longer seem convincing; thirdly, there are many indications that there are multi ple modes of thinking, some of which are independent of language. Nevertheless, some weaker kind of influ ence of language on thinking is by no means ruled out; the problem is to find some way of investigating it.
John Lucy lanthropology, University of Pennsylvania! argued that Whorf's opinions had in fact been systemati cally misunderstood, even by those psychologists and anthropologists in the 1950S who sympathetically tried to test them. Whorf emphasized the "undercurrent" of systematic grammatical distinctions that run across a number of grammatical paradigms and their effects on habitual thinking. Modern tests of his hypotheses have been much more atomistic, focussing on specific seman tic domains le.g., colorl defined exrralinguistically-not at all, Lucy argues, in the spirit of the original proposals. Studies should focus on grammatical fearures lor their "covert" correlatesI whose frequency of application forces habitual distinctions. They should also be carried out in a strictly controlled j comparative experimental way on at least two contrastive languages simultane ously. In his own work, he has tried to show how, in contrast to English count nouns, which presume a form and unit, all Yucatec Mayan nouns are much more like English mass nouns, coding only substance, not form or unit. Sorting experiments seem to show that this does indeed have systematic effects on how speakers of each language perceive and conceptualize objects. Lucy went on to argue las Dell Hymes, Charles Frake, and others had beforel that there might also be a kind of linguistic relativity at the level of language function and use.
Cognitive psychology as a whole remains highly resis tant 10 the suggestion that there could be systematic cultural effects in thinking, but different views are held in developmental psychology. Dan Slobin Ipsychology, University of California, Berkeleyl offered a reformula tion of the linguistic-determinism hypothesis which provided one of the main foci of the symposium: instead of holding that language determines thought, it seems much preferable 10 talk in terms of "thinking for speak ing," that is, to argue that the coding categories of a specific language force a speaker to engage in a specific kind of on-line thinking, Slobin and collaborators have carried out a series of experiments in a number of lan guages [including Hebrew, German, English, Spanish J Turkish, Mandarin, and Japanese! in which children of three years and up are shown a SlOry told only in pic tures and asked to verbalize it, Each language may re quire subtle conceptual distinctions, for example, in ver bal aspect or definiteness of nouns, that are simply missing hom the grammatical inventory of others; speakers may be able to make the same distinction peri phrastically or by implication, but mostly they don't ISlobin's statistics even suggest that children slowly learn not to do thisJ. The result is a deep-seated training of speaking-for-thinking that shows up in the systematic misanalyses that the adult learner of a second language tends to exhibit. Kay's arguments were intended as a cautionary tale. Janet Keller [anthropology, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana) also had such a tale, this time eth nographic. After studying blacksmithing for some time with Charles Keller, she had come to the conclusion that there are some kinds of activity that are mediated by an essentially image-driven kind of thought rather than a linguistically categorized mode of thinking. She argued for parallel, modular kinds of thought language-based, image-based, motor-based, emotion based, etc. In this broader conception of human think ing, linguistic determinism will play at best a small role. One might agree with the image Keller projected but disagree with the arguments. It turned out, for example, that the blacksmiths in question are hi-tech specialists who take orders over the phone from experienced collec tors and negotiate the exact kind of desired product ver bally. They do this partly in terms of an expert vocabu lary but partly in loose terms [heavy, sleek, etc.) that somehow seem to do the job (Keller suggests a "transla tion" into images). The magical process whereby "loose talk lJ somehow can serve to specify exact detail has be come a central concern of current theorizing in linguis tic pragmatics, where it is now taken to be the basic kind of language usage. Perhaps, then, blacksmithing talk is not so special and not such clear evidence for thinking without-words. Still, the example was compelling and remained a base to touch throughout the symposium.
A number of papers dealt with spatial language and conceptualization across cultures.This was not entirely by chance, because the domain of spatial conceptualiza tion seems central to human cognition, clearly with a basis in the human visual and motor apparatus, and therefore subject to strong universal constraints. How ever, it is also a domain in which culturally derived dis· tinctions are likely to playa significant role in habitual discrimination and orientation.
Stephen Levinson [Max Planck Research Group for Cognitive Anthropologyl reported on collective work that seems to show that cognitive scientists have over estimated the cross·cultural commonality of spatial con ception, assuming the universality of linguistic expres sions similar to the English spatial prepositions [in, on, at, in front of, behind, to the side of, etc.l. For example, speakers of Guugu Yimidhirr Ian Australian language first described by Havilandl make do without any of those concepts, instead employing an elaborated car dinal-point system. Thus Bill is standing in front of the store has to be expressed in terms glossing, as appro priate, Bill is standing [say) north of the store, and simi larly for microlocations. To employ the system, all speakers have to be absolutely oriented at all times, and since all spatial descriptions have to be accompanied by such cardinal-direction specifications, speakers will also have to dead-reckon and to memorize scenes with cardinal directions attached for future description. On the face of it, this looks like a knockdown case of lin guistic lor culturalI determinism of thinking well be yond Slobin's thinking-for-speaking: computation of ori entation and location and additional requirements on memorized detail penetrate deeply into thinking-in genera!. Levinson argued that one should look for such cases, where a particular linguistic practice clearly has far-reaching cognitive consequences beyond the mo ment of speaking.'
Levinson went on to describe the spatial system in the Mayan language Tzeltal Icurrently under investigation with Penelope Brownl that also fails to fit the kind of generalization that linguists and psychologists have con fidently made about universals of spatial description. Tzeltal locative description forces the speaker into a choice between a large set (ca. 300) of verbal roots that precisely encode shape, angle, and disposition of the sub ject lone cannot just say "The bowl is on the table" but is forced to specify whether the bowl is right way up or upside down, has an open mouth or a more restricted one, etc.). Thus Tzeltal-speakers are forced into elabo 2. One might, though, want to argue that it is not so much the language that determines the cognitive consequences as a cultural practice that is also reflected in the language. rate shape/disposition distinctions at the level of thinking-far-speaking. On the other hand, the language lacks the projective spaces associated, for example, with English to the front of and to the left of (instead, one can specify that objects are in contact with specified parts of other objects). The absence of left and right as relational spatial locutions seems to correspond with an "invisibilityll of left-right inversions reflected in infor mal experiments. Thus such a system may have some real perceptual consequences [rich perception of shape and relatively poor perception of spatial relations be tween nonadjacent objectsl. Various participants were sceptical that much could be inferred from left-right fail ings/ to which all humans seem prone to various de grees; but/ as Lucy pointed out/ from a Whorfian point of view, either the absence of the perception of left-right inversions is significant in Tzeltal or the presence of the left-right distinction in English is even more striking the sceptic can't have it both ways' It was clear in the symposium that it is going to take more than such ethnographic examples to make a con vincing case for psychological claims about linguistic determinism, in however mild a form. Melissa Bow erman (Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguisticsl, re ported on psycholinguistic work showing that children at a remarkably early age (IB months or earlier) are al ready attuned to language-specific differences in spatial description. For example, in English we talk both of rats (as spontaneous agents I running into boxes and of agents (causatively) putting rats into boxes; but in Korean the into concept {or its equivalentJ is subsumed in the verb roOt in the causative cases while being expressed by a separate word in the spontaneous-motion cases. Further/ in Korean the spatial concepts built into the causative roots crosscut the spatial concepts expressed by English in VS. oni instead there are verbs that express /ltight at tachment" vs. "loose fit": so whereas we see a "naturalII affinity between putting the lid on the jar and putting the iar on the table, Korean forces the distinction be tween making the lid attached to the iar vs. putting the jar in an unattached contiguity with the table.
Bowerman's findings about how early children master the distinctions in the native language run counter to much received wisdom in developmental psychology. The picture derived in large part from Piaget suggested that children acquire prelinguistic concepts of space, which are then mapped more or less directly onto the language (a picture consistent with much recent theoriz ing in the cognitive sciences). But Bowerman argued that the linguistic distinctions made by different languages crosscut so deeply and are learned so early that this can not be the whole picture; rather, the native-language dis tinctions seem to guide the child's development, focus sing on particular conceptual distinctions. Her work, together with Lucy/s, raises far-reaching questions about the underestimation of culture-and language-specific factors in psychological theory.
Granted that cultural factors may playa significant role in the structure and content of human cognition, if all the essentials of culture are universal there is no Volume ]2, Number 5, December 1991 1617 argument from cultural/linguistic determinism of cog nition to cognitive relativity. Two participants took strong lines on cultural universals. Len Talmy (cognitive science, State University of New York at Buffalo) pro posed that we entertain the idea of a special mental faculty "hard-wired" for the acquisition of culture, a culture-acquisition device Imodelled on Chomsky's language-acquisition devicel. Such a device would pre dispose the child to notice certain kinds of behaviors and presume certain kinds of abstract conceptual gener alizations/ which amount to universals of culture. Our conscious access to these processes is very restricted/ giving rise to secondary rationalizations (ethnotheories of culture, including sociologies) that may have little to do with the actual processes involved in the acquisition of culture.
Talmy usefully articulated an extreme form of cogni tive reductionism of culture which left many partici pants aghast. Anthropologists do, however, need to come to tenus with the very different epistemological and ontological assumptions current in cognitive sci ence and articulate their own positions much more care fully than they have in the past (Goodenough's defini tion of culture as the set of ideas necessary to "pass/! as a native/ for example, opens the door to cognitive reductionism). That is why the organizers attached some importance to developing the idea of a middle ground between the mental and the physical, of culture embodied in/ especially/ human interaction. Talmy's own pOSition was vulnerable to the attack that whereas Chomsky's language-acquisition device had at least an initially plausible module of acquisition (language as a discrete mental object! /3 there is no corresponding men tal entity "culture," since absolutely everything a native member of a culture does is imbued with a cultural manner.
Pascal Boyer [anthropology, King's College, Cam bridge) also took a strong line against cultural relativity, more in the tradition of the strong mental universalism associated with recent developments in French anthro pology (most recently especially with Dan Sperberl· Stripped of the skillful sugar-coating intended to make his ideas anthropologically palatable, his argument was that if we can find significant universals among the most "culturally relative" things we know of-religious ideas-we have more or less crucified cultural relativity. He then proceeded to argue that religious ideas are, in large part, just ordinary pancultural ideas, with just a dash of culture-specificity thrown in. Anthropologists tend to focus on the oddity of the small culture-specific element/ ignoring the commonality of the rest of the system. The common background, he argued, lies in hu man reasoning about intelligent agents: we are cogni tively predisposed to distinguish such agents and make special kinds of teleological inferences about them. The cultural dash of sauce consists in particular assumptions about the nature of supernatural agents Iphysical proper ties such as invisibility/ behavioral predispositions/ etc.). The two together-:-a developed set of inferential princi ples about agents and some slightly peculiat and note worthy agents-make just the kind of package that //grabs ll the attention (following the theory of relevance in Sperber and Wilson r9861 and thus gets culturally transmitted.
Talal Asad (anthropology, New School for Social Re searchl and other participants objected that such an ac count of religion scarcely holds for the developed theolo gies of the major religions and scarcely does justice to the moral and affective implications of systems of reli gious ideas. Nor/ on the face of it/ does it even satisfacto rily distinguish religion from science (where common sense principles mingle with outlandish ideas).
Talmy/s and Boyer/s mentalist explanations for cul tural transmission were countered by two participants (Jean Lave and Elinor Gchs) who sought to locate cul tural acquisition and learning in social interaction and activity. Both speakers argued for a reconceptualization or recasting of the basic issues/ with Lave introducing the notion of social practice as the site of learning and Ochs arguing that to account for cultural acquisition we have to set aside the traditional reference-centered view of language.
Lave (education, University of California, Berkeleyl ar gued/ following extensive work on literacy and appren ticeship in Liberia and the U.S.A./ that current learning theory is much too focussed on the ratiocinative self and fails to attend to the social practices in which cultural ideas are/ as it were/ embodied. The tendency to see learning in this way/ as abstract ideas transmitted from master to acolyte, should be seen in sociohistorical per spective as a reflection of our own socia-polity and its ideology. Lave came under fire from cognitive-science participants/ who pressed her on how concepts could be embodied in practices and not just, where they wanted them, in the head. She responded with examples of how people work things out for themselves by manipulations of physical objects (e.g., calculate 45' slivers of cake by superimposing two sets of cross-cuts). Keller/s earlier ex ample of the blacksmith/s imaging in iron was once again relevant. An apprentice blacksmith/ wordlessly in structed by example! has more than an internal visual image of the desired product to learnj he must also expe rience and acquire a whole process of tactile and motor coordinations that may have little conceptual represen tation. Where now are we to locate the cultural idea? We could locate it in the image in the master smith/s mind and presume that the image is transferred to the apprentice (much as Keller seemed to argue). But we could say that the cultural idea does not reside there at all; after all/ the apprentice may visualize the end prod uct in a quite different way and still reproduce accept able copies. Instead, as Lave presumably would/ we could hold that the idea is embodied in the lump of iron itself/ together with the processes that produced it. [Incidentally, much of what archaeologists do would seem to be based on an acceptance of ideas as embodied in things.) Gchs (applied linguistics, University of California, Los Angeles) also took the position that culture is learned through its embodiment in practice-especially, she ar gued, linguistic practice. She outlined an ambitious the ory of socialization through the medium of language. She claimed that many linguistic elements are Janus faced/ performing the task of contributing to proposi tional statements on the one hand but simultaneously/ through inherent indexicality/ constituting moves on the level of discourse and social interaction/ on the other. The concept of indexicality here is the wide Peircean one/ the idea that there are certain aspects of signs that direct the attention to the environment of the speech event, and it played a central role in the argu ments of a number of the participants. Ochs tried to formulate some general constraints or patterns that characterize these socially laden indexicals. One of her more interesting ideas was that most such indexicals work indirectly/ by virtue of indicating the speaker/s stance or attitude (modal or affectiveI towards the propo sition expressed. Then, at second remove/ the assump tion of a particular stance may suggest a specific social action or relationship. For example, the English modal hedge maybe might index speaker/s epistemic uncer tainty and then/ indirectly/ deference to addressee/ or it might index speaker!s deontic indecisiveness (Gandy after supper, maybe!) and thus indirectly signal author ity over addressee. And so on/ for a wide range of parti cles/ grammatical elements/ prosodic features/ etc. Ochs tried to generalize about the kinds of markers thus em ployed and their social effects and claimed that one may detect strong universal patterns underlying culture specific tendencies to explOit these patterns to different degrees. She suggested that the human ability to acquire and transmit culture might quite largely depend on this shared universal complex of associations between stance markers! on the one hand, and social actions and relationships, on the other. Human in-built implicit un derstanding of these indexical relations between stance and social life provides children with a means to con struct the learning environment in which the rest of culture can be acquired. Linguistic relativity in this re gard would then be closely circumscribed by universal tendencies.
Och/s pOSition on the social valence of language can perhaps be placed as intermediate between two earlier traditions. The one/ associated with Gregory Bateson/ early paralanguage investigators (Ray Birdwhistell and othersL and later social psychologists/ attempts to find distinct channels for social information in human com munication. Thus one hopes to isolate social markers or indices. The other tradition, eloquently argued by Ed mund Leach/ is that such II ritualf/ information is carried not by particular acts or events but by the manner in which all acts are performed (much sociolinguistic the ory, e,g./ research on politeness/ falling here). Thus one cannot isolate social markers or indices/ since the social information lies in the modulation of every action throughout its course. Ochs/s position here would seem to be very close to Guroperz's, but whereas she empha sizes individual linguistic indices, he suggests that a constellation of "contextua!ization cues" indexes a whole social frame of interpretation, which in tum may lead to inferences about individual participants' states of mind.
With these background discussions on cultural tela tivity and universals and on the way in which culture is acquired through its externalization in practice and social interaction, the conference moved on to consider how the context and discourse dependency of language interpretation might require a new perspective on lin guistic relativity. Linguistic relativity, at least in the Whorfian formulation, is a hypothesis about the intrin sic mismatch in the expression of meaning across lan guages. Whotf thought about meaning in terms of the semantic content of grammatical and lexical elements, but theories of meaning have progressed a great deal since then-one of the greatest changes being an in creasing recognition that linguistic meaning resides not only in lexica-grammatical content (semantics) but also in background principles of use (pragmaticsl. The phe nomenon of indexicality forces the recognition of the role use plays in meaning. The meaning or at least the interpretation of certain words depends on who says them where and when. Recently, the suspicion has grown even among formal semanticists (by trade reluc tant to recognize the role of context) that indexicality is rampant throughout language (consider words like even or local or ago). Perhaps all references to things have a kind of in-built temporal-spatial localization relevant to the time and place of speaking Iconsider 1 used to like the picture in the hall: only contextual information will help to tell you whether I mean the picture now hanging in the hall or since banished to the bathroom, etc. I. The dependency of meaning on contexts and discourses, with all their apparent specificities, would seem to imply weak linguistic relativity. Now, if indexicality is rampant throughout language J and if the interpretation of such indexical items depends on local practices and principles of use, we have to look at the idea of linguistic relativity afresh. Even if there were complete semantic isomorphism on the level of grammar and lexical meaning (e.g., if the whole world spoke English), we could still have linguistic relativity at the level of interpretation. So how culturally relative are principles of use? There was surprisingly little dis cussion of this at the conference, largely because we don't really know. There are very few studies of any depth of the pragmatic systems of "exoticll languages, what few there are being well represented by partici pants at the conference. Ochs, Levinson J Haviland, Clark, Hanks J and Gumperz, at least, all made strong assumptions about the universality of various principles of use, while some of them also emphasized the cultural specificity of other usage principles. Only Gumperz dealt specifically with discourse-level interpretive dif ferences across linguistic and cultural contexts.
William Hanks (anthropology, University of Chicagol argued that deictic systems, although clearly exhibiting similarities across languages, are to a significant extent 1 Volume 32, Number 5, December r99r 1619 constructed over time through culturally specific, situ ated practices. He reported on what must be the most detailed study of any deictic system, the system of (espe cially! spatial deictics in Yucatec Maya. In terms of the kinds of distinction lexically encoded, the system does not look especially exotic, with terms for here, there, The suffixes thus serve the general purpose of direct ing the interpreter's attention to specific search do mains, but they do not alone suffice to individuate a referent. The addressee must take into account the 50 cially structured distinctions thus invoked. For example, the socia-physical world is structured in terms of do mestic spaces of various kinds j in extended-family hous ing clusters, subunits will have distinct but unmarked plots of land-such a boundary being, say, immediately pertinent to the interpretation of here vs. there. On top of that, one must take into account that the nature of Ihe boundary will differ according to whether the view point is that of consanguines or affines. Thus the inter 4 pretation of a deictic item is intrinsically bound up with cultural distinctions and practices, and Hanks drew on Bourdieu's concept of habitus (as did Gumperz and Lave) to make the point. Within the field of deictics at least, Hanks made it seem incontestable that one is dealing with a kind of linguistic relativity at the level of inter pretation.
John Haviland (Reed College/Max Planck Research Group for Cognitive Anthropology) took the theme of indexi cality farther. It has long been nOliced (e.g., by Jakobson and Buhler) that deictics are context-sensitive not only in that their referents are picked out relative to a context bur also in that the very context can be shifted away from the current context-of-speaking. Thus, in fohn wondered what he should say now the word now refers not to the speaker's present but to the present of John's wondering. This phenomenon of "transposition," which has also been studied by Hanks, was the focus of Havi land's presentation. What he showed, through a series of transcribed examples, is how pervasive in natural dis course such transpositions are and how enormously in tricate and multilayered they can be. For example, an Aboriginal speaker of Guugu Yimidhirr, lelling a story, gestures north, exactly as the protagonists on a particu lar beach mUSI have done when referring to a boatwreck out at sea; thus we are transposed away from the context of utterance to the protagonists ' context at that moment in the story; then, mentioning a new protagonist, the storyteller gestures to have him coming down the beach towards the other protagonists/ and we are transposed to his point of view, looking east. Finally, to make sure his listeners have understood the identity of the man, he is identified by a gesture to the workplace of his son of the same name-but this gesture is now in the frame of the speaking conlexl. Thus in a few lines and a few transitory gestures we have three Iispaces" of interpreta· tion invoked and slipped between/ almost invisibly but crucially for the interpretation. Haviland's examples from three cultures left the distinct impression that one requires long·term socialization in local knowledge and practice to ca tch such fleeting clues to essential ele ments of interpretation. Again, this amounts to a de facto cultural relativity of interpretation. But Haviland was also keen to make the point that there would seem to be universal processes of transposition at work: the sortS of "spaces" shifted betw~en and the kinds of lin guistic and gestural clues to such switches seem to be limited.
John Gumperz (anthropology, University of Califor nia, Berkeley, and Max Planck Research Group for Cog nitive Anthropology) pursued the theme of how frame works essential to interpretation can be invoked by the communication itself. He outlined his notion of a licon textualization cue/' in effect a special kind of indexical which in combination with a cluster of other such cues invokes a specific kind of activity when interpreted in the light of grammatical and lexical knowledge. Such cues thus indicate how an utterance is to be understOod and what its rhetOrical role in a sequential discourse is. As had Haviland, he showed how subtle and fleeting such cues are and how bound they are into local dis course practices by analyzing a collaborative storytelling episode. But he concentrated on the analysis of what was introduced above as a hypothetical case, the situation in which speakers of the same grammatical/lexical system le.g., English) have distinct systems of indexical inter pretation. On the basis of long-term studies, he argued that many speakers of English from the Indian subconti nent utilize distinct sets of contextualization cues from those employed by English-speakers in England, where both reside. Concentrating on interview situations with bureaucratic "gatekeepers/' Gumperz discerns twO ways in which contexualization cues can be culturally rela tive. First, the signalling media, the linguistic triggers l may themselves be different across cultures and even across speakers of the same language from different so cial networks. For example, speakers of Indian English highlight parts of an utterance in a different way-using pitch register and/or loudness shifts that extend over an entire phrase while standard British English-speakers use syllable accent. Secondly, the content that is signalled-whether the global framework of the activity or the more local turn-by-turn rhetorical point-may significantly vary. For example, the Indian English speakers tend also to have a different concept of a I'gate keeping" interview, assuming that it should be con ducted more in the manner of a petition to a benevolent magnate (compared with the British expectation that one should make a case for one's rights under the rules).
Gumperz argues that such interpretive differences can create huge understanding gulfs which may have direct consequences for how individual participants fare in an interaction. It is as if contextualization cues invoked the very framework of interpretation, much as Ochs's stance markers are held to constitute the social matrix for culture-learning, so that small II m isfires u at this level create massive misunderstandings at other levels, whether referential or social. Gumperz hints that the mastering of such cues and their meanings is dependent on deep immersion in a social network and in social relationships of the "friendship" type. The psychologists present questioned whether there might not be a "criti cal period" for the acquisition of such cues, drawing at tention to the difficulty of adult second-language acqui sition in just such subtle areas, but that would not be inconsistent with the requirement also for a special kind of social interaction experience. The social anthropolo gists wondered to what extent Ilgatekeepers" by virtue of their social role may be obliged to require applicants to show that they know the local rules-that is, whether such interviews are partly a test of real or adopted eth nicity. But Gumperz argues that it is in the nature of complex social structures to engender diverse social net works l which then acquire linguistic specializations that breed interpretive barriers. He thus views the fun damental linguistic relativity at this level as a universal by-product of complex social organization and universal principles of contextualization cueing.
The idea that linguistic knowledge and practice might be fractionated and differentially distributed through a community, yielding local linguistic relativities, found unexpected support from a psychologist. Herb Clark (psychology, Stanford University) argued that the classi cal picture of linguistic relativity, in which we and {sayl the Hopi inhabited different linguistically constructed worlds, failed for the simple reason that it was based on the wrong theory of meaning. Instead of thinking of meaning as inherent in words through arbitrary meaning conventions, one should think of lexical meaning as an outcome of collaboration over a naming or referring practice, with the result that different collaborators may senle on different meanings. An interactionally derived solution to such a referring problem may then provide a precedent for the next occasion-and so we have a "convention" to call an X a "Y," but such a convention is always localized to a network or community (follow ing the analysis of the philosopher David Lewis). Thus the word murder may have different stabilized meanings for lawyers, Catholic anti-abortionists, and feminists, who participate in different social networks in the same speech community. And we constantly invent /lnonce" terms/ knowing that our interlocutors will try to infer the reference that we have in mind by scanning back ground associations that may be specific to the partici pants/ as in She's very New York or I macintoshed my vita. Furthermore, where we do find stabilized conven tions they may be not so much conventions of meaning as conventional ways of conceiving things that run across a series of words: for example, we talk of eye glasses and pants as coming in pairs, the Dutch view them as coming singly, and new kinds of pants (Bermu das, hot pants! will always be plural in English bur sin gular in Dutch.
It follows that we can't think of a IIworld view ll as inherent in a language, somehow detached from all the practices established for its use. The same point had ear lier been made by focussing on indexicals [by Hanks, Haviland, Ochs, and GumperzL where the meaning is intrinsically connected to use. But Clark's argument would make the relativization of meaning to use en tirely general. On this account, meaning is also relativ ized to collections of petsons who have the same back ground of experience and associations. By adopting a theory of the collaborative nature of meaning (itself un Whorfianj, one would seem to end up adopting an ex treme form of linguistic relativity. But this view needs to be taken together with intrinsic psychological con straints on interactive processes of meaning determina tion, for example, on what interlocutors will find a natu rally salient solution to a nonce concepti and, indeed, together with universal linguistic constraints on seman tic structure.
Clark and Gumpetz emphasized how practices which determine linguistic interpretation are differentially dis tributed in a community. 'The point was also made with extraordinary ethnographic material by Elsa Gomez Imbert (C.N.R.S., Parisi. She has been doing linguistic and anthropological work (with Stephen Hugh-Jones, Cambtidge! in the Vaupes basin of northwestern Ama zonia. The area is well known for its linguistic exogamy (a man must find a wife who speaks a diffetent lan guage!. These facts challenge presumptions abour the whole conception of linguistic relativity as based in the association of one "tribe, II one culture, and one lan guage. However, Gomez drew attention to a number of misconceptions in the sociolinguistic literature. Some corrections for the record: a few language-groups are di vided into exogamic subunitsi women continue to speak their native languages throughout their lives to every body; children are raised speaking their mother's lan guage, then switch to their father's language from about age six and thus are raised bilingually; the preferential marriage exchange system makes it likely that a boy will marry a girl from his mother's language group, who speaks his own developmentally first language, although his socially first language is his father's. This helps to explain how linguistic exogamy is possible across major language boundaries. animal taxonomies across such languages are at least nearly isomorphic, despite the scarcity of cognates. However, the grammatical systems and in particular the systems of classification encoded in numeral/nominal classifiers are extremely different. The Tukanoan lan guages use nominal shape-based classifiers only with in animate nouns but in many grammatical contexts; the AIawakan languages use such classifiets with both ani mate and inanimate nouns in more restricted grammati cal contexts. The shape distinctions made are also differ ent in part. Underlying the application or nonapplication of classifiers there seems to be a different semantics for nominals. Nouns that take classifiers seem to be viewed as mass nouns or collectives, the classifiers serving to individuate them (compare Lucy's intepretation of Mayan!. The evidence fot this is that, for example, in Baniwa Ian AIawakan language) a species of pig that roams in bands requires a classifier, but a bigger species that wanders solo (along with other salient individual animalsj does not. There are thus conceptual underpin nings to the classification system.
What happens histotically over long periods of con tact? Gomez looked in detail at one language, Kubeo, that seems intermediate: it is a Tukanoan language but has Arawakan-like nominal classifiers on animate nouns. Investigations reveal that Kubeo has a peculiar history: it is spoken by the descendants of Arawakan speakers who moved into Tukanoan territory and adopted a Tukanoan language. They now practice lin guistic exogamy with Arawakan speakers of the lan guage that they probably originally spoke (Baniwaj as well as with othet Tukanoan language-groups. Their nominal classification system is grammatically Tuka noan except for an overlay of the Arawakan system squeezed into novel grammatical interstices. Above all, Kubeo-speakers classify animals, except the very salient individuals l although the system is not quite isomorphic with that of Arawakan languages like Baniwa. Gomez concludes that what we have here is the preservation of a conceptual scheme carried across from an Arawakan into a Tukanoan language, where it is regrammati calized. The conclusion would be that even in such in tensely multilingual communities, it is possible to maintain distinct conceptualizations of domains attached to specific languages. This conclusion con trasts, for example, with wotk by Gumperz and Wilson in India that has suggested that in such circumstances languages tend to acquire grammatical and semantic iso morphism l with "token" surface differentiation. Kay had argued that the conceptual perspectives encoded in language must be relatively trivial l because speakers of one language hold inconsistent perspectives; Gomez's data would suggest that even when distinct conceptual izations are in the same (muitilingualillhead/' they can be powerful enough to force the restructuring of an adopted language.
The Vaupes situation dramatically illustrated Gum perz/s and Clark's point that linguistic relativity is se mantic diversity not simply across localized tribes or nations but across geographical and social space. Pam Wright (anthropology, Wenner-Gren Foundationl made a plea for a historical perspective on conceptualizations of a domain (recalling, e.g., the older work by Trier and others on changing structures of semantic domains within a single language!. As exemplar she chose the conceptualization of their own ethnicity by a people rad ically buffeted by histOry, the Caribs, deported in steps across the Cari bbean by colonial powers. She tried to reconstruct the sets of opposing labels for ethnic units and "kinds" of persons at three different times-pre Columbian, early colonial, and present. The structure of distinctions was motivated by quite different sociopo litical forces at these different points (e.g., the accu mulation of contrasting ethnic groups through the slave trade and later importation of indentured labor!_ Wright showed that one could hardly divorce the study of such terms from the historical-political situations to which they are a response.
The effect of sociopolitical forces on cognitive life can perhaps most directly be seen in the introduction of new knowledge and communication technologies. Goody'S argument that literacy confers cognitive advantages in trinsic to the two-dimensional spatialization of a linear medium can be read as claiming that literacy has univer sal effects, "levelling" cultural and linguistic relativity. Akinnaso argued that whereas the technology may have intrinsic advantages, as with any tool the degree to which its potentialities are exploited depends on local social conditions. He spoke from a peculiar position: born in a remote part of Nigeria free ofIslamic influence, he was himself illiterate till age t2 and can recount how a few persons introduced literacy, for specific reasons and with specific effects, into his natal village. He now bridges worlds, one where written words playa marginal role as aide-me-moire to practical activities or petitions to politiCOS and another where the very soil tilled is the written word.
Do knowledge technologies level cultural relativities in the same way that {say! the proliferation of new arma ments enforces a uniformity in military strategy? Akin nasa urges caution-old technologies (e.g., oral rhetoric, mnemonic systems) can perform some of the same func· tions as the new, while new technologies can fail to be fully exploited or, alternatively, find novel uses. Thus the effects of literacy are not uniform across societies, and even within a social system one can find many dif ferent kinds of exploitation of the medium. It follows that one has to allow for cultural relativity in the exploi tation of technologies that have potentially universal enabling effects.
Asad, in a summary comment on the symposium's accomplishments, pointed out that the express attempts to introduce social factors had hardly got the attention they deserved. Too much of the discussion, he felt, fo cussed on individual thinking. Since the data consist of human vocalizations and actions, one must retain the larger picture of situated social action or risk lapsing into the psychological reductionism that some of the papers tried hard to avoid.
What has all this to say to general anthropology' An thropology is, like philosophy, a generalizing discipline, and just as in philosophy speculative domains turn into empirical sciences, so in anthropology there is a ten dency to yield to other disciplines any empirical special isms that may emerge in rhe study of mankind. Since the rise of highly technical and successful formal ap proaches in linguistics, there has been a corresponding decline in anthropological interest in language. It is sim ply hard to compete with the specialists, and only a small band of linguistic anthropologists attempts to do so. But it is important for anthropologiStS to know what the linguistic specialists do not know-where not much progress has been made in the last 20 years or SO. And the great gap here is the comparative study of meaning: we know almost nothing new, save in a few domains, about lexical semantics from a systematic cross linguistic point of view 1 very little about indexical sys tems, almost nothing empirical about cross-linguistic tendencies in pragmatics. Introductory textbooks on se mantics and sociolinguistics point to the celebrated Ber lin and Kay color universals, implying that we could do a Berlin and Kay on any domain whatsoever-whereas, as Kay pointed out in the symposium, color is a unique domain because it is one of the few for which the periph eral perceptual system can be shown to be hard-wired. There are no general lessons from the universals in color, even taken together with those in ethnobotany and kinship. In effect, the data against which to measure the linguistic-relativity hypothesis still hardly exist, and the general anthropologist can continue to play an im portant role in describing "exotic" systems of classifi cation and usage and bringing them to the attention of the specialists, while linguistic anthropologists are in a unique position to question and construct incipient the ory about universal properties of meaning and interpre tation.
Anthropologists also need to demonstrate for col leagues in other disciplines to what extent meaning and interpretation are dependent on specific local cultural practice. Anthropologists celebrate cultural difference, and per haps in doing so they exaggerate it; but it is a useful antidote to tendencies in cognitive science, where cul ture and often language 3re treated as invisible, not as mediators between the mind and the world. Working out the differences in presuppositions between anthro pological and cognitive-science ways of seeing things is a precondition to establishing worthwhile dialogue. Lin guistic issues will always be central to this dialogue, although, as Maurice Bloch has pointed out in the r990 Fraser Lecture, the issue of learning and the organization of knowledge offer further points of common interest. {Bloch would like to dethrone language, on the basis that culture is not transmitted through expliCit linguistic in structionj but Ochs's point that culture is transmitted indexically on the fly, while people are simultaneously talking about other things, undercuts his position.1
Asad reminded the symposium that translatability is central to anthropology and that that issue more or less coincides with the question of linguistic relativity. The symposium seemed to establish that these issues, ai
